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Abstract
This paper presents an intergenerational self selection model of migration and education
that is capable of explaining the evolution of earnings and education across three gener-
ations of immigrants. By structurally estimating the model it is possible to quantify the
human capital level of Mexicans in light of the self-sacrice made by the rst generation of
Mexican immigrants. The results suggest that there is a signicant one time loss of human
capital faced by immigrants upon migration that is not transmitted to their children. Also
parents with larger amounts of human capital tend to migrate more and tend to choose to
remain high school educated. However, given the better educational opportunities oered
in the US, they migrate with the expectation of their children becoming college educated.
Therefore, measures that rely on the earnings performance and educational attainment of
immigrants underestimate the amount of human capital they bring into the host country.
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This paper is motivated by observations regarding the performance of immigrants and their
descendants. Solely focusing on Mexican immigrants in the US the following three facts can
be observed.1 First, there is a signicant gain from migration in terms of earnings. The earn-
ings of Mexican immigrants in the US are higher than the earnings of non-migrant Mexicans.
Earnings continue to increase from the rst to the second generation of Mexicans in the US,
but then stop increasing or regress from the second to the third generation.2 Second, condi-
tional on education, the returns from migration are higher for high school educated than for
college educated immigrants.3 Earnings increase for both groups from the rst to the second
generation, but more for college than for high school educated. However, from the second
to the third generation, high school earnings stabilize while college earnings decrease. Third,
measuring educational attainment in terms of the share of college educated individuals, Mex-
ican immigrants are less educated than non-migrant Mexicans. Second generation Mexicans
substantially improve their education compared to their parents, while attainment for the third
generation is slightly lower than for the second.
An explanation of this evidence is provided, which is based on a structurally estimated
intergenerational self selection model of migration and education. The results of the estimation
indicate that it is important to distinguish between two functions of human capital. On the
one hand human capital is used to generate earnings, on the other hand it is also transferred
to future generations determining their future earnings. The estimated model shows that
the rst function is greatly and negatively aected by migration while the second is not.
That is, immigrants face a signicant loss of capacity to translate their human capital into
1The data used are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) - March supplement. The survey collects
information on foreign born individuals independently of their status of residence in the US and therefore includes
information on legal as well as on illegal immigrants. As with census data, illegal immigrants in the CPS might
have a lower response rate than legal ones. However, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show that accounting for the
possible under count of illegal immigrants in the census 2000 data does not change signicantly the statistics of
immigrants in general.
2The denition of rst generation immigrants includes all Mexican born individuals who live in the US. The
denition of second generation includes all US born individuals with at least one Mexican born parent. The
denition of third generation includes all individuals who identify themselves as Mexicans and are not included
in the rst or second generation. The third generation includes all generations of Mexicans beyond the second.
3The denition I use of high school education includes all the individuals with a high school degree or lower
education College educated are those with a high school degree that attended, for at least one term, a college.
1earnings, while there is no loss of capacity to transfer human capital to their children. This
distinction explains the large gap in earnings between rst and second generations. Immigrants
have lower earnings because they are unable to use part of their human capital to generate
earnings. However, the amount of human capital transferred to the second generation is not
aected by the same loss and is consequently greater than the earnings of the rst generation
would suggest. Moreover, second generation Mexicans do not face the same diculty the rst
generation faces, they are capable of fully utilizing the inherited human capital signicantly
improving their performance compared to their parents. The model also indicates that the
loss of human capital is higher for college educated immigrants than for immigrants with high
school education or less, which explains their lower returns from migration.
This paper also suggests that Mexican immigrants are positively selected with respect to
human capital. This contrasts with Borjas (1993), who, by looking at the average increase of
earnings from the rst to the second generation, concludes that recent cohorts of immigrants are
drawn from the lower tail of the human capital distribution in their home country. However, the
hypothesis proposed by Borjas that immigrants are negatively selected is inconsistent with the
observations on the second and the third generation of Mexicans. Given the intergenerational
persistence in the transmission mechanism of human capital, if immigrants are drawn from the
lower tail of the human capital distribution, then the second generation should, on average,
have higher human capital than the rst, and the third higher than the second. On the
contrary, this paper suggests that because of the positive self selection average human capital
within the second generation is higher than the stationary average, and so are the earnings,
while the third generation and successive show a reversion to the mean.
Even among the high school educated, immigrants are positively selected. Given the di-
culty to adapt their own human capital to the US labor market, particularly for college educated
immigrants, it may be optimal for them to avoid facing the cost of acquiring a college educa-
tion in Mexico. Some of these individuals would have chosen to attend a college were they not
able to migrate to the US. However, because of altruism toward future generations, migrating
is an optimal choice for them due to the benets of their children and grandchildren, who
are expected to become college educated taking full advantage of the inherited human capital.
This explains why, despite the positive selection, educational attainment among immigrants is
2lower than among non-migrants.
Finally, the paper evaluates alternative policies that aim at integrating immigrants into the
US labor market that may have positive impacts on the human capital distribution in the host
country, and policies that aim at contrasting the brain drain from Mexico to the US. I propose
two policies that integrate immigrants faster, one that targets high school educated and the
other college educated immigrants. The simulation results under these alternative policies
suggest that both policies can be eective at increasing the human capital of immigrants.
However, while keeping the overall cost of the policy the same, the second policy generates
larger eects on human capital than the rst. By reducing the loss of human capital faced by
college educated immigrants, the policy generates direct positive eects on the overall human
capital and earnings of the rst generation, but also indirect eects on the rst and the second
generation by strengthening the self selection process of immigrants. I also propose one policy
that contrasts the brain drain by reducing the cost of education in Mexico. The simulation
results indicate that this policy is eective in contrasting the brain drain from Mexico to
the US. Immigrants become less self-selected with respect to human capital and among non-
migrant Mexicans the average human capital increases. Moreover, the policy also reduces the
migration rate especially among the highly educated Mexicans.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brie
y looks at some of the related literature.
Section 3 highlights a few features from the data. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the model that is
estimated and discuss its identication. Section 6 discusses the estimation results and section
7 evaluates the eects of alternative policies. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The evidence reported in this paper relative to Mexican generations of immigrants in the US
is consistent with several papers in the migration literature. Chiswick (1978) rst noticed
that second generation immigrants tend to perform better in terms of earnings than the rst
and the third generations. More recently, Card (2005) found similar evidence despite using
very dierent data and type of immigration into the United States. Chiswick analyzes data
from immigrants that migrated mainly in the period before 1965. Immigrants from this period
3were subject to a quota system law passed in 1925 that favored North European immigration.4
Card's analysis targets immigrants that migrated after 1965. Card reports that even among the
least educated, and in particular Mexicans, second generation immigrants on average overcome
80% of the disadvantages that their parents experienced. Similar ndings are also reported
in the sociological literature by Glick and White (2004) and Kao and Tienda (1995). Using
the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), they nd that the second generation of
immigrants is more likely to continue education to post secondary education than the rst
and third generation. In addition, McKeever and Klineberg (1999) report that among the
Hispanics in Houston the second generation of immigrants is better educated and also has
higher earnings than the rst and third generation.
One contribution of my paper is to the literature on the selection mechanism of immigrants
in a destination country. Borjas (1987) and Borjas (2000) found that recent cohorts of immi-
grants in the US are negatively selected. Among them are Mexicans, which represent about
30% of the whole foreign born population in the US. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), on the
contrary, suggest that Mexican immigrants are positively or intermediate selected. A strong
positive selection with respect to human capital is also consistent with the evidence produced
by a large body of research in the sociology literature. Glick and White (2004) estimate a
multinomial logistic model that predicts the likelihood that a student remains with less than
high school education, graduates from high school, or attends college. They nd that, among
immigrants in general, the second generation is more likely to go to college than the third gen-
eration, and, although the results are less robust, this is true also among Mexican immigrants.5
Moreover, consistently with the altruistic motive for migration and positive self selection on
human capital, they nd that parents' expectations about their children's education as well as
parents' involvement greatly increases the likelihood of enrolling in college. Similar conclusions
are drawn also by Kao and Tienda (1995) who claim that foreign-born youth are at a disad-
vantage due to their limited English skills, but since their parents encourage them to acquire a
college education, second generation youth are likely to perform well in school. However, they
4\The law was in
uenced by the research of Brigham (1923) who classied immigrants into four categories:
\Nordic", \Alpine", \Mediterranean" and \Asian", and argued that members of the Alpine and Mediterranean
races had lower intelligence than Nordics[...]" Card (2005) footnote 1, p. 2.
5The level of signicance of the relevant parameters is much higher for Asian descent than for Mexicans.
However, this is in part due to the fact that the sample of Mexicans is less than one third of that of Asians.
4nd strong support that this is the case for Asian immigrants, but no support for Hispanics.
3 Sample Characteristics
This section focuses on the dynamics of earnings and education across successive generations
of Mexicans in the US and compares the performance of these generations with Mexican non-
migrants - those who live in Mexico. Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of earnings and
educational attainment for dierent generations of Mexicans in Mexico and in the US. The
table presents average log hourly earnings, educational attainment6, as well as age, years of
schooling, the total population size and the number of observations. The sample used for
the analysis is based on the 2000 Mexican census, for observations on individuals resident in
Mexico, and on the Current Population Survey (CPS), March supplement from 1994 to 2008,
pooled together.7
First, there is a large dierence between the log earnings of Mexicans working in Mexico
and Mexicans in the US. Table 1 shows that the rst generation of male immigrants earns on
average about 1.5 log-points more than those who remained in Mexico. There is also a large
dierence between rst and successive generations of Mexicans in the US, with the second
and third generation of males earnings about 0.37 log-points more. Table 1 also shows that
the rst generation has, on average, a much lower level of education than their descendants.
While about 13.4% of immigrants have some college education, the percentage is more than
double among the second and third generations. However, it is also interesting to note that
male immigrants are less educated than those who remained in Mexico - 15.4% of them have
a college education - and that the second generation is slightly more educated than the third
- 45.4% compared to 43.7%. As for the earnings from the second to the third generation they
slightly increase by about 2%.8
To better understand the relationship between education and the intergenerational evolu-
tion of the earnings of immigrants, I run a regression of log hourly earnings on a set of dummy
6Educational attainment is measured here as the share of the referenced population with some college edu-
cation.
7See Appendix A for details on the sample selection.
8Note that males of the third generation are on average older than males of the second, a fact that might
explain the earnings dierence.
5Table 1: Sample - Descriptive Statistics
Men Women
Variable Mexico 1stGen 2ndGen 3rdGen Mexico 1stGen 2ndGen 3rdGen
Log Wages 0.6831 2.1796 2.5447 2.5641 0.7585 1.9768 2.3613 2.3550
(0.0024) (0.0046) (0.0082) (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0054)
College Share 0.1539 0.1337 0.4541 0.4369 0.2356 0.1768 0.5265 0.4970
(0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0069) (0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0049)
Age 36.5823 39.8096 36.7312 38.0781 34.9013 41.7280 36.7970 38.5028
(0.0349) (0.0898) (0.1629) (0.0954) (0.0470) (0.1327) (0.1747) (0.0997)
School Years 8.3826 8.4668 12.2449 12.3304 9.8088 8.9248 12.5101 12.5600
(0.0147) (0.0342) (0.0299) (0.0187) (0.0224) (0.0534) (0.0315) (0.0182)
Population 11031430 1229532 500392 1086856 5226140 441129 388572 895240
N. obs 102448 13597 5257 12155 44136 5539 4404 10596
Author's calculation based on a sample combined of observations from the Mexican Census 2000 and
CPS surveys from 1994 to 2008. See Appendix A for more details on how the sample is selected.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
variables for generation and education and a set of individual characteristics, including a square
function of age centered at 48 interacted with the education/generation dummies, and a set
of dummies for year of birth.9;10 I also include dummies among the controls for survey years
and for geography.11 Table 2 reports the returns to migration and education, as well as the
evolutions of earnings across all generations.12 The table reports results for men and women
using two denitions: the standard denition and a stricter denition. The standard denition
of the second generation is the one provided above which identies the second generation as
all those US born individuals with at least one parent born in Mexico. The stricter denition
imposes that a person not only has at least one parent born in Mexico, but also identies
her/himself as Mexican.
9The introduction of the year of birth in the regression allows to net out the eect of belonging to a particular
cohort on earnings. Cohort eects can be relevant in earnings regressions with data on migrants as dierent
cohorts can be aected in their migration decisions by the particular business cycle at the age in which migration
is usually a real option. The year of birth can be used for CPS data since there are 15 pooled surveys from 1994
to 2008. The same is not possible for Mexican data.
10Similar to Altonji and Doraszelski (2005), the inclusion of a polynomial function of age centered at 48, about
the middle of the working life span considered in the data, is intended to capture the evolution of earnings before
and after this mid point so that the regression returns an average of past, current and future earnings, and can
be interpreted as a proxies for lifetime earnings.
11Clearly geography cannot be considered entirely exogenous, especially in a migration model. The reason
to include geographical dummies is to take into account the dierent cost of living, and therefore purchasing
power of earnings, in dierent locations.
12the results reported in Table 2 are computed by taking the dierences between the estimated coecients
reported in Table A.1. Appendix A reports the details of the regression model and the sample used. All the
estimates are based on OLS regressions.
6The rst four rows present the returns to college for each generation. Focusing on the
rst column, it can be noted that the return to college is quite high for each generation of
men, but is much higher for Mexican non-migrants. Among the rst generation of Mexicans in
the US, rst row, those men with college have an average earnings 0.38 log-points larger than
those with only high school or less. The gain from college increases for the second generation,
0.45 log-points, but then decreases for the third, 0.40. In row 4, an impressive 1.22 log-points
quanties the returns to college in Mexico.13
Rows 5 and 6 present the returns to migration calculated by looking at the dierences
between the log earnings of Mexicans living in Mexico and the rst generation Mexicans in
the US for each schooling category. Row 5 shows that immigrants with only high school in
the US earn on average 1.63 log-points more than Mexicans living in Mexico, while for college
educated the gain is only 0.79. That is, the returns to migration are much lower for college
educated than for high school educated Mexicans. Rows 7 to 10 show the evolution of earnings
from the rst to the second generation and from the second to the third. From row 7 it appears
that the change from the rst to the second generation for immigrants without college is highly
positive, showing a gain of 0.35 log-points. The gain for immigrants with college from the rst
to the second generation is even larger than for the high school educated at 0.42. From the
second to the third generation there is instead a contraction of earnings of about 1%, not
statistically signicant, for immigrants without college, and a more substantial and signicant
contraction of about 7% for college educated.14
The last two columns of Table 2 show that the results are robust to the denition of second
and third generations. Including in the second generation only those who identify themselves
as Mexicans - the stricter denition - does not change the results substantially, as can be seen
by looking at the returns to college for the second generation in row 2, columns 1 and 3, and the
13Mexico Attanasio and Binelli (2010) in Figure 10 report a wage premium for college educated males compared
to high school or less educated around 90% for the year 2000 . They use micro data from the ENEU, a survey
on urban employment run by the INEGI that is representative at the national level. The dierences between
Attanasio and Binelli estimates and mine are due to two main factors: they do not control for age, cohort and
geography; their data only covers urban employment and not rural.
14In interpreting these results, particularly the dierence between the rst and successive generations, it
should be noted that the group of high school or less educated Mexican immigrants is much more heterogeneous
than the equivalently dened group of the second and third generations. Evidence of this fact is reported by
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Caponi (2006). Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C provide more evidence of
this heterogeneity and a short discussion of its implications for the interpretation of the results.
7Table 2: Intergenerational Evolution of Earnings
Dependent Var.: Log Hourly Wage Standard Denition Stricter Denition
Men Women Men Women
Returns to College
1st Gen. Imm. 0.3832 0.3654 0.4259 0.3923
(0.0232) (0.0341) (0.0197) (0.0291)
2nd Gen. Mexicans 0.4546 0.4510 0.4389 0.4505
(0.0284) (0.0324) (0.0295) (0.0341)
3rd Gen. Mexicans 0.3995 0.4504 0.3992 0.4511
(0.0175) (0.0193) (0.0171) (0.0189)
Mexicans in Mexico 1.2230 1.1440 1.2232 1.1440
(0.0081) (0.0118) (0.0079) (0.0116)
Returns to Migration
Without College 1.6263 1.3507 1.6231 1.3629
(0.0194) (0.0274) (0.0167) (0.0249)
With College 0.7865 0.5721 0.8259 0.6112
(0.0284) (0.0401) (0.0245) (0.0354)
Intergenerational Dynamics
From 1st to 2nd Gen. No Coll. 0.3479 0.3194 0.3445 0.3140
(0.0212) (0.0270) (0.0210) (0.0267)
From 1st to 2nd Gen. With Coll. 0.4193 0.4050 0.3575 0.3723
(0.0301) (0.0386) (0.0288) (0.0362)
From 2nd to 3rd Gen. No Coll. -0.0100 -0.0317 -0.0040 -0.0265
(0.0226) (0.0265) (0.0227) (0.0268)
From 2nd to 3rd Gen. With Coll. -0.0652 -0.0323 -0.0437 -0.0260
(0.0246) (0.0269) (0.0256) (0.0283)
evolution of the earnings in rows 7 to 10. This gives some condence that the bias induced by
relying on self-identication as Mexicans to dene the third generation, criticized by Duncan
and Trejo (2005), is negligible.15 The facts shown in this section motivate the next section of
the paper, which introduces a theoretical model capable of replicating the features of the data.
4 Model
Presented here is a partial equilibrium intergenerational altruistic model where a person chooses
the level of education and the country of residence. Following Borjas (1993), I assume that the
15In Appendix C I discuss the results in more detail and present another set of results using data from the
Latino Sample 1989-1990 of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
8choice of the country of residence is based on the earnings capacity of an individual represented
by the endowment of human capital and the alternative returns to human capital across loca-
tions. Following the vast body of research that shows the existence of multiple skills, I assume
that individuals are endowed with an amount of human capital composed of two abilities that
can be used alternatively depending on the acquired level of education: 1) an intellectual or
college ability used to generate earnings if some college education is acquired; and 2) a manual
or high school ability used in the absence of college education.16 Therefore, agents not only
choose their location, but the level of schooling they want to acquire, or, in other words, which
of the two abilities they want to use for producing earnings.
Acquiring an education has a cost, which is dierent for the two levels of education. Wages,
or skill prices, are also dierent depending on the skill used. Further, skill prices and schooling
costs dier across countries. I also assume that there is unidirectional migration from Mexico
to the US, as observed in the data.17 Moreover, because there is no uncertainty about the
returns to migration and its psychic cost when the decision to migrate is made, there is no
return migration.
Mexican born individuals can choose from the following four options: 1) high school and
working in Mexico; 2) college and working in Mexico; 3) high school and working in the US; and
4) college and working in the US. The last two choices imply that the individual migrates. The
choices of American born individuals are only between the two levels of education considered;
in this sense their choices are identical to those in Mayer (2008).
As in Borjas (1993), I assume that migrants face some costs of migration. However, while
Borjas assumes that there is a psychic or pecuniary cost that does not aect the earnings
capacity of immigrants, as in Caponi (2006) I assume that there are two costs: a psychic cost;
and an ability cost. The psychic cost is assumed uncorrelated with the abilities and makes
immigrants homesick for the rest of their working life. The ability cost makes part of the
ability endowments of immigrants unusable for producing earnings in the host country.
16See Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) for the role of cognitive and non-cognitive skills in explaining
labor market and behavioral outcomes. See also Sattinger (1993), Heckman and Sedlacek (1990), Heckman and
Scheinkman (1987) and the seminal work of Willis and Rosen (1979) for more evidence on multiple skills and
self selection into education.
17This assumption is made in order to simplify the exposition of the model, but it does not have any implication
as the model, given the estimated parameters, would predict that only Mexicans can have an incentive to migrate
to the US and not viceversa.
9Following Borjas (1993) I also assume that the second and successive generations of immi-
grants inherit the human capital from their parents, and use the intergenerational framework in
Mayer (2008) to model the intergenerational transmission of abilities from parents to children.
Therefore, the endowment of an individual depends stochastically on the endowment of his or
her parent (each parent has one child). Skills are transmitted following a bivariate autoregres-
sive process, in which each skill is allowed to be transmitted at a dierent rate. The process
is assumed to be the same for Mexican and American born individuals and their children that
stay in the parental country. However, it can be dierent if parents and children are born in
dierent countries in the sense that the transmission of skills can be aected by the loss of
capacity to transmit human capital faced by immigrants. The choice of schooling does not
aect the endowments of ability transmitted to children. This does not rule out the possibility
that parents may invest in the human capital of their children, particularly at an early age.18
Parents with higher levels of abilities transfer more ability to their children. This can be due to
genetics but it can also be the result of investments in human capital.19 Moreover, because the
schooling choice considered is between high school and college, the assumption does not rule
out that early schooling from elementary to the completion of high school can have an eect
on the development of both abilities, allowing for a causal eect of parents' early education
on their children's abilities. However, by the time the decision to go to college is made, the
intergenerational transmission process is completed and the person making the decision knows
with certainty the amount of both abilities.20
Finally, parents care about their children and they maximize their welfare given by their own
lifetime utility plus the discounted welfare of their children, or, in other words, the discounted
utility of the whole dynasty. Given this structure, if the Mexican born parent wishes to migrate,
he or she has to take into account the loss of part of her or his abilities, the psychic cost of
18In this sense the paper does not distinguish between nature and nurture, a distinction that according to
Cunha and Heckman (2007) is obsolete.
19The sector specic abilities may include intelligence, work ethic, or physical attributes; all of which may be
the result of investments in human capital prior to the decision of whether to attend college.
20While there is an extensive literature that documents a positive relationship between parents and children's
schooling, particularly for mothers, Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) nd that this relationship disappears, or
even becomes negative, for mothers when appropriately controlling for unobserved components that determine
parents' schooling such as ability. The relationship remains positive between fathers' and children's education,
but the measured causal eect is small. These ndings are consistent with the assumptions of the model that
it is primarily ability endowments that are transferred from parents to children.
10moving, and the gain for future generations of being born in the host country. This gain
depends on the intergenerational transfer of abilities between parents and children born in
dierent countries.
The decision process of a Mexican born agent can be divided into two steps. In the rst step,
the agent, conditional on living in one location, chooses the education level that maximizes
his or her utility. In the second step, the agent compares the utility he or she obtains in each
location plus the discounted value of the utility of future generations, and chooses to migrate
or not by choosing the higher one.
I start by dening the earnings of an individual within a dynasty with a given endowment
of abilities. The earnings of an individual are proportional to the level of the ability used,
which depends on the chosen level of schooling, and the skill price a;k, which depends on the
country of residence a = fmx;usg and the schooling level k = fH;Cg, where H stands for
high school and C for college. Immigrants' earnings are also aected by the loss of human
capital that reduces the capacity to use their abilities to produce earnings. This is symbolized
by zIg, where z is the proportional amount of human capital lost upon migration, and Ig be
an indicator that takes value 1 if the generation g of the dynasty migrated and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, let sk be the natural logarithm of the ability levels of an individual's endowment,
the log-earnings of each generation are represented by,
wa;k;g = a;k + sk;g   zIg: (1)
The abilities endowment of an individual belonging to generation g + 1 depends on the
endowment of her parents who belong to generation g. The mechanism that governs the
intergenerational transmission of abilities within a dynasty is as follows:
sk;g+1 = bk(sk;g   zIg) + uk;g+1; (2)
were  represents the reduction of capacity to transmit human capital which is assumed to be
proportional to the loss of human capital or abilities originally faced by the immigrant parent.
The parameters bk describe the degree of intergenerational persistence in the transmission



















Mexican born individuals make a joint schooling-migration decision. However, it is possible
to analyze the schooling decision separately from the migration choice. In fact, given that the
schooling decision, conditional on the migration decision, does not aect the state of future
generations, it can be analyzed without taking into account the altruistic feature of the model.
Therefore, a Mexican that remains in Mexico decides to attend college if the lifetime earnings,
less the cost of college, that can be obtained by being college educated are higher than the
lifetime earnings obtained by being high school or lower educated. That is, if
wmx;C;g   mx;C > wmx;H;g; (3)
where mx;C is the cost of a college education, and assuming that the cost of high school is zero
for any generation. The cost of a college education is assumed to be proportional to potential
lifetime earnings re
ecting the importance of the foregone earnings due to the fact that college
educated individuals start earning a few years later than high school educated individuals.
Rewriting equation (3) using equation (1) gives,
mx;C   mx;H   mx;C > sH;g   sC;g: (4)
In contrast, immigrants choose to attend college if
us;C   us;H   m;C > sH;g   sC;g; (5)
where m is the cost of a college education for a Mexican immigrant. The second and third
generation Mexicans choose to attend college if
us;C   us;H   us;C > sH;g+i   sC;g+i; i = 1;2; (6)
where us is the cost of a college education for a US born individual. Note that there are three
dierent costs of college: the cost of acquiring a college education for a Mexican who decides
to stay in Mexico; the cost for a Mexican who decides to migrate to the US; and the cost for
a US born individual, either of the second or third generation. Because the cost of education
re
ects foregone earnings as well as direct and psychic costs associated with going to college,
it is reasonable to assume that immigrants may face dierent costs from both non-migrants
12and second and third generations of Mexicans in the US. The direct and psychic costs faced
by immigrants may be close to the ones faced by non-migrants given that the education is
acquired in Mexico, while foregone earnings are comparable to the ones faced by second and
third generations given that they work in the US. Therefore, the combination of the two sources
of costs is likely dierent across the three groups.
Another important feature of the theory presented here is altruism. The migration decision
made by Mexican born parents aects the state of their children and their welfare since it
determines their place of birth. Therefore, a Mexican born agent decides to migrate or not
depending on his or her own gain from migration as well as the eects of his or her decision
on the welfare of future generations.
The value of migrating for a Mexican born agent is composed of a part that describes the
gain from migrating for the current generation given by their earnings w minus a psychic cost,
plus the (discounted) expected value to future generations of being born in the US. Assuming
log utility, and given that one period is equivalent to one generation and that there is no need






   ; (7)
where vus is the value of being born in the US,  is the parameter that measures altruism, and
  is an utility cost of migrating drawn at the time the migration decision is made from a normal
distribution with mean   and variance 2
 . The value of the psychic cost is independent across
generations. In the above Bellman's equation the state space of each individual is determined
by his endowment (sH;sC). Moreover since the choice of education of one generation does not








fEwus;k;g+jg    : (8)









13An agent that decides to remain in Mexico takes into account that his or her child will be
born in Mexico and will have the opportunity to migrate in the next period. Therefore, the
value for an agent of not migrating is given by his or her current earnings plus the expected




wmx;k;g + E max[vmx(sH;g+1;sC;g+1);vm(sH;g+1;sC;g+1)]
o
; (10)






Equation (11) simply states that, depending on his or her ability endowments, a Mexican born
agent chooses to migrate or not and the level of schooling such that the best option available
is obtained.
5 Estimation Procedure
Structural estimation of the model is implemented using the method of moments. Since the
moments of the model that have data counterparts cannot be analytically derived, the method
of moments is implemented using model simulations. McFadden (1989) provides the theoretical
foundation to the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM).
As shown in the previous section, the model studied is closely related to Mayer (2008).
In particular, although Mayer estimates his model using data on Americans, the process that
determines the intergenerational transmission of abilities is assumed to be identical for Amer-
icans and for Mexicans. This allows the utilization of the work already done by Mayer (2008)
and the ability to use his parameter estimates while concentrating on estimating the remain-
ing parameters related to the behavior of Mexicans. In this sense the estimation performed
here can be viewed as a second stage of a Two Stage Simulated Method of Moments estima-
tion (2SSMM) which was rst proposed by Newey and McFadden (1994) and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002)21.
21Newey and McFadden (1994) provide the foundation of the two step GMM procedure, while Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) extend this procedure to the simulated method of moments.
14More formally, let x(un;0)
N
n=1, be a series of observed data, and x(us
n;), n = 1;:::;N
and s = 1;:::;S be a set of S series of simulated data, conditional on . Denote (x(un;0)),
or simply (xn), a vector of moments of the data. The SMM procedure consists in minimizing
an objective function representing a measure of the distance between moments from data
































 is a matrix that denes the relative weights of the moments.
In this case (xn) can be partitioned into two vectors, m(xn) and g(xn), of moments. The
rst vector represents moments related to observations on Americans, and the second related
to observations on non-migrant Mexicans as well as rst, second and third generation Mexican
immigrants in the US. The set of parameters can also be partitioned into two sets  and 
, such
that the set of parameters  does not aect the moments m(xn). These parameters are the ones
that only aect the behavior of Mexicans and not the behavior of Americans. Because m(xn)
and g(xn) are independent moments and, most importantly, because m(xn) is independent
from , it is possible to estimate 
 independently and use the estimates in a second stage to
estimate . The parameters Mayer estimates, taken as coming from the rst stage, are

 = [bH;bC;H;C;]; (13)
while I estimate the following set of parameters
 = [mx;C;us;H;us;C;m;H;us;C;mx;C;z;; ;2
 ]: (14)
Note that the skill prices in the US are included in the set of parameters that is assumed to
not aect the moments derived from American data. To estimate the model, I use only data
on Mexican generations in the US and Mexico, and I do not use data on Americans. Although
I do assume that the intergenerational autoregressive process is the same for Americans and
Mexicans, it is not necessary to assume that Americans and Mexicans in the US face the
same set of skill prices. Neighborhood eects, discrimination, and other reasons could make a
Mexican with the same abilities as an American facing a dierent wage. Therefore, in what
15follows, us;k should be interpreted as the skill prices for Mexicans in the US.22
There are two more parameters in the model that cannot be identied by the data used
in the estimation procedure independently from other parameters: the discount or altruism
factor , and the skill price of high school ability in Mexico mx;H. Since the skill prices can
only be identied up to scale, I x the lower skill price in Mexico to be equal to zero, i:e:
mx;H = 0. As for the discount parameter, I assign to it the value of 0:3079.23 Assuming that
a period is about 30 years long, the value re
ects a discount factor of 0:9615 per year, which
would generate an interest rate equal to 0:04.24;25
Given the partition of the moments and parameter vectors and taking ^ 
 as given from
Mayer's estimation, I proceed with the second stage of the 2SSMM procedure as in Gourinchas




































Importantly, the fact the Mayer's estimates can be used in the 2SSMM context, allows me
to use the information on the precision of ^ 
, its covariance matrix, in order to obtain correct
standard errors in my estimation. Let the Jacobian of the g(xs
n; ^ ; ^ 
) moment functions with





 be the covariance matrix of the 
 estimates, and 
g the covariance matrix of the data
moments. It can be proved26 that a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of  in a
2SSMM procedure is obtained by
22In the rst stage Mayer estimates the dierence between the skill prices for Americans. Footnote 39 shows
that the estimated dierence of the skills' prices of the skill prices for Mexicans in the US is not signicantly
dierent from the estimated dierence of the skills prices for Americans. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that
the skills prices are the same.
23To perform sensitivity analysis I re-estimate the model with alternative values for beta. The results are
reported in Section 6.
24Notice that the model is dynastic. Agents see their children as themselves in the future and in this sense
the model can be interpreted as a classical selsh model with innitely lived agents. Therefore, the discount
factor has the same interpretations as in those models, and not as in standard OLG models with dierent selsh
generations trading their assets.
25In Section 6 I conduct sensitivity analysis on the model with alternative values of , which shows that,
while it is dicult to pin down any particular number in a wide range of positive values, the estimation clearly
rejects the hypothesis that altruism has no role in the migration decision.
26See Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2005) for a proof based on Newey and McFadden (1994) and Gour-
inchas and Parker (2002).
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g is the simulation correction. The weighting matrix I use is obtained by
inverting the data moments covariance matrix, W 1 = 
 1
g so that it is possible to rewrite
equation (16) as follows























The part that characterizes this estimator as dierent from the usual SMM covariance





, which is the contribution to the covariance matrix of the
uncertainty from the rst step. V ar() increases if the covariance 

 of the rst step estimates
increases, and also increases if G
, the sensitivity of the second step moments to the rst step
estimates, is higher.
5.1 Identication Strategy
Mayer (2008) provides a discussion of the identication of the parameters 
 in the rst stage
estimation. He uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The major
advantage of using the PSID in his study is that it is possible to link observations of parents to
observations of children. Mayer (2008) uses observations collected between 1968 and 1976 for
parents, and observations collected between 1992 and 2001 for children. He collects information
on schooling and earnings for each individual. He rst collects earnings information for every
year and then uses the individual time series to create a measure of lifetime earnings. He uses
the information on lifetime earnings and schooling on each parent-child couple to calculate
the moments that are used in his SMM estimation procedure. The main moments used are
the averages and variances of earnings for each generation, conditional and unconditional on
schooling, the averages and variances of earnings of children conditional on the schooling of
their parents, the share of college educated children and parents, and the correlation between
earnings and school choices of parents and children. The variation of earnings conditional on
schooling choice and the intergenerational persistence in earnings identify the parameters H,
C, bH and bC. The relationship between the parents earnings and educational attainment of
their children identies the parameter .
17Table 3: Data Moments for the SMM Estimation: Males only
Moment Data s.e.
Migration Rate 0.1003 0.0008
College Mex. in Mex. 0.1539 0.0010
College 1st Gen. in US 0.1337 0.0009
College 2st Gen. in US 0.4541 0.0013
College 3st Gen. in US 0.4369 0.0013
Earnings HS 1st Gen. in US 1.6263 0.0103
Earnings HS 2st Gen. in US 1.9742 0.0193
Earnings HS 3st Gen. in US 1.9642 0.0129
Earnings C. Mex. in Mex. 1.2230 0.0099
Earnings C. 1st Gen. in US 2.0095 0.0238
Earnings C. 2st Gen. in US 2.4288 0.0210
Earnings C. 3st Gen. in US 2.3636 0.0140
See Appendix A for a detailed explanation on how the moments are calculated.
My focus here is on the identication strategy for the second stage. The moments available
for the second stage estimation are summarized in Table 3. The sample used to derive the
moments in the table is the same used for Table 2.27 The rst moment in Table 3 is the
migration rate given by the share of rst generation Mexican immigrants on all Mexican born
individuals. The moments in the second to the fth rows are the shares of individuals with a
college education in each generation group. The remaining rows in Table 3 show information on
earnings. All of the earnings moments reported in Table 3 are expressed in log hourly earnings
and are averages relative to the lowest earner group represented by non-migrant Mexicans with
a high school education or lower. The second column of Table 3 shows the standard error for
each moment.28
Once I have all of the moments I need to be certain that the model is identied. The
determination of the selection mechanism, and therefore the identication of the parameters
that primarily determines it, is based on the dierences between the third and the second
generation moments. Since all the parameters faced by the third and the second generation
are the same, the dierences between the second and the third generation moments are due to
the changes in the ability distribution only.29
27See Appendix A for a detailed description of the sample used and how the moments and the covariance
matrix are derived.
28See Appendix A for the details on how the covariance matrix is derived.
29The model assumes a stationary intergenerational environment. Increased returns to education, lower costs
18This, together with the initial conditions on the ability distribution for the generation of
Mexicans non-migrants that has to be stationary, determines the distribution of abilities for
all generations given that the intergenerational dynamics of the ability distribution is known
from the rst stage. In particular, it determines the average abilities of the rst generation of
migrants compared to the non-migrant Mexicans, which is the selection mechanism. Therefore,
the changes of the earnings moments and the educational share from the second to the third
generation identify the skill prices in the US as well as the variance of the disutility shock
distribution, all the parameters that mostly aect the selection mechanism, although they
ar not the only ones. The skill prices are identied because the averages of the abilities
distribution conditional on the schooling choice are know, the variance is identied because
it determines the intensity of the changes in all three moments.30 Moreover, the knowledge
of the distribution of abilities across generations allows to identify the parameters from the
moments on earnings and educational attainment. From the earnings of the second generation
is identied the parameter describing the loss of ability to transmit human capital , while
the cost of a college education in the US is identied by the share of college educated. From
the earnings of the rst generation is identied the loss of human capital z, while from the
share of the college educated is identied the cost of college for the rst generation. From the
moments of Mexicans non-migrants are identied the cost of a college education in Mexico and
the skill price for the college skill. Finally, the average of the disutility shock is identied by
the migration rate.
of communication and transportation, and immigration policies have changed in the last decades, and these
changes may have aected the migration decisions of dierent generations of migrants. However, particularly
for Mexico-US migration, the reduction of migration costs implied by better communications and transportation,
may have been negligible in terms of lifetime earnings in the US. As for the legal environment, the abolition
of the Bracero program in 1964 likely increased the cost of migrating to the US disproportionately to people
with lower skills. However, since then illegal immigration started to be an important phenomenon, and as of
today most of the immigrants entering the US from Mexico are illegal immigrants. The change in the legal
environment brought an important change in the status of the immigrants, but did not change the number and
type much. Finally, the skill premium increased signicantly in the US, as it did in Mexico at a very similar
pace, keeping the relative returns in the two countries similar over time. See for example Kurokawa (2006), who
explains the common trend with increased international trade between the two countries, and Binelli (2009),
who documents that the \convexication" of earnings driven by skill biased technical change has been a common
phenomenon for many countries.
30Figures D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D show simulations with a very low variance and with a higher variance.
By looking at the gure it is possible to see that the impact of a lower variance is to strengthen the selection
mechanism. The simplied model presented in the same appendix gives some analytical results that help to
understand how the selection works, and it shows that, under certain parameterizations, the selection mechanism
is monotonic with respect to each ability - although with opposite sign.
196 Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the estimates from Mayer (2008) that are used as rst stage estimates. The
table shows signicant and sizable parameters related to the intergenerational transmission of
abilities. The intellectual ability is shown to be more persistent (bC = :52) than the manual
ability (bH = :11).
Table 4: First Stage Parameter Estimates






Mayer (2008), Table 2.
The standard deviation of the shocks associated with the transmission of the intellectual
ability is larger than the standard deviation of the shock of the manual ability. Together with
the persistence parameters, this implies that the variance of the intellectual ability in a cross
section of individuals is higher than the variance of the manual ability.31 Proposition 3 in
Mayer's paper proves that this, together with a strong correlation between the abilities, is a
sucient condition for the probability of children's college attendance to be a positive function
of the parents' wage when parents are also college educated. Moreover, the probability of
having college educated children is also increasing in parents' earnings when parents are not
college educated. As claried later, this point has important consequences for the migration
model presented here.
Table 5 presents the estimated parameters and the standard errors obtained by the second
stage of the 2SSMM procedure.32 Model 1 in the table refers to the model discussed above and
for which I discussed the identication. Model 2 is a generalization of Model 1 in which the
parameter related to the loss of human capital (z) is allowed to dier by education. Finally,







32Standard errors in Table 5 are obtained using equation (17). To evaluate equation (17), I needed to
numerically calculate the derivatives of the moment functions with respect to both sets of parameters. I also
needed the covariance matrix of the data moments, and the covariance matrix of the estimates from the rst
stage. The last bit of information was kindly provided by Mayer.
20Model 3 is a restricted version of Model 2, where the  is constrained to be zero.
The last row in the table shows the inverse of the goodness of t for each model. These
values are calculated as weighted sums of squares of the deviations between the simulated and
data moments, where the weights are obtained using the optimal weighting matrix.33;34 The
t of Model 2 is substantially better than the t of Model 1, which implies that allowing the
loss of human capital to dier by education substantially improves the explanatory power.35
The restrictions in Model 3 do not change the t much from Model 2, which supports the
hypothesis that there is no loss of capacity to transmit human capital from the rst to the
second generation of Mexicans. The rest of the quantitative analysis focuses on the results of
Model 3 as it is more parsimonious in terms of parameters compared to Model 2, and it shows
a much better t compared to Model 1.
The rst two rows of the table show the price set faced by Mexicans remaining in Mexico. As
stated previously, the skill price for the lower educational level is normalized to zero (mx;H =
0). Therefore, all of the skill prices are relative to it and should be interpreted as the dierence
from the lowest skill price. The table shows that the skill price for college educated in Mexico
(mx;C) is about 0.6 log points and is signicant at the 5% level. This parameters indicates the
returns to college in Mexico for a randomly selected person, that is, net of self selection. The
cost of a college education for a Mexican remaining in Mexico (mx) is about 1.09.36 Assuming a
high school or less educated non-migrant earns about 50,00037 US dollars, the return to college
is about 41,000 US dollars implying an average cost of attending college of about 60,000 US












34A formal over-identifying restriction test can be done on Models 1 and 3 by testing the null hypothesis
(^ ; ^ 
) = 0; in both cases the model is rejected. A possible reason for rejecting is that the model is not 
exible
enough to capture the dierences between the two types of occupations, especially among immigrants. Model
2 has as many moments as parameters and therefore cannot be tested with the same test.
35In Model 1, the simulated earnings of high school educated immigrants are signicantly lower than their
data counterpart, while the earnings of college educated are higher. In Models 2 and 3, these dierences vanish
almost completely. This is shown in Table B.1, Appendix B.
36Table C.1 in Appendix C shows that non migrant Mexicans have the highest average years of education
among college educated while they also have the lowest average years of education among the high school
educated. Part of the high returns to education may be explained by heterogeneity within the groups in terms
of years of schooling. In this sense, the estimated skill price for college might be upward-biased together with
the cost of education.
37The gure is obtained using the information from Table A.1 in Appendix A. Lifetime earnings are calculated
assuming a high school or lower educated Mexican resident works for 43 years and each year her earnings increase
due to accumulated experience. The lifetime earnings is a present value measure obtained by discounting using
yearly interest rate equal to 4%. The gure is also adjusted to reproduce a value in US dollars PPP adjusted.
21dollars.38 This gure is impressive if compared to actual Mexican earnings. Perhaps factors
like proximity to colleges and the fact that some of the direct costs associated with attending a
college are priced in US dollars contribute to explaining the relative high costs. However, the
high cost of a college education in Mexico could also be explained by the inecient nancial
sector that in Mexico implies much higher costs for borrowing to nance the period of study
and this might make it very dicult for a large part of the Mexican population to actually
access a college education. That is, Mexican students may face borrowing constraints that
Americans do not face.
For the same reasons immigrants face higher educational costs than Americans. Their
foregone earnings are closer to the foregone earnings of Americans since they have the option
to migrate earlier and work in the US without a college education or wait until they are college
educated and migrate later. However, the fact that they need to acquire their education in
Mexico implies that they face the same diculties that non-migrants face.
Table 5: Parameter Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Parameter Point Est. s.e. Point Est. s.e. Point Est. s.e.
mx;C 0.593 0.191 0.596 0.058 0.598 0.086
mx 1.091 0.235 1.095 0.069 1.095 0.123
us;H 1.950 0.062 1.944 0.019 1.943 0.057
us;C 1.962 0.049 1.960 0.052 1.964 0.046
m 0.554 0.113 0.258 0.333 0.260 0.122
us 0.102 0.101 0.109 0.079 0.109 0.056
z 0.405 0.074 zH 0.346 0.021 zH 0.346 0.017
zC 0.642 0.249 zC 0.644 0.060
 0.006 0.227 0.003 0.063
  0.000 0.000 2.927 0.020 0.000 0.000
2
  2.920 0.104 0.323 0.013 2.925 0.058
(^ ; ^ 
) 147.88 9.43 11.86
Rows 3 and 4 show the skill prices for Mexicans working in the US. The skill price for
high school educated Mexicans working in the US (us;H) is 1.94, while for college educated
Mexicans in the US (us;C) it is 1.96, both signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% level.
38The cost is calculated as 50;000(e
mx;C  e
mx;C mx). This cost is net of self selection in to college. Since
the cost of attending college is proportional to the college earnings, the self selection implies an even higher cost
for those who attend college.
22The dierence between the college and the high school skill price for Mexicans born in the US
measures the return to college net of self selection, which in this case is about 2% and not
signicantly dierent from zero.39 Row 5 in the table shows the cost of college attendance for
Mexican immigrants (m), which is estimated at 0.26, equivalent to about 81,000 US dollars,
while row 6 shows the cost for US born Mexicans (us), estimated at 0.11, equivalent to 37,000
US dollars.40
Rows 7 to 10 present the estimates of the loss of human capital. Row 7 shows the direct
loss faced by immigrants with a high school education (zH) while row 8 shows this for a
college educated immigrant (zC); they are, respectively, 0.35 and 0.64.41 These estimates are
both signicantly dierent from zero at the 5% level, and they are also signicantly dierent
at the same condence level.42 Therefore, the model suggests that the intellectual ability is
more dicult to adapt to the US labor market than the manual ability. This explains why
immigrants have lower returns from their education than other generations without resorting
to explanations based on negative selection. In Model 3, the loss of capacity to transmit human
capital to their children () is constrained to be zero, however, columns 1 and 2 show that the
other models estimate this parameter to be close to zero. Finally, the estimates for the mean
and the variance of the utility cost distribution are 2.92 and 0.32 respectively, both signicant
at the 5% level.43
As mentioned in Section 5.1 the parameter  is not estimated, rather the value of 0.3079
is assigned to it. In order to evaluate the importance of this parameter I perform a sensitivity
analysis and re-estimate the model with two alternative values: 0.154 - Model Beta-1 and
39Although it is not reported here, Mayer (2008) also estimates this dierence for Americans and reports a
value of 4.8% with a standard error of 0.08. This suggests that the returns to college for Mexicans in the US
and Americans are not signicantly dierent.
40The dollars gures are calculated as in footnote 38,
41Recalling footnote 14, and the fact that the direct loss of human capital is mainly identied by the earnings
dierence between Mexican immigrants and the second generation Mexicans for each educational group, it is
possible to conclude that this parameter might be biased upward. In fact, if Mexican immigrants with high
school education or lower had the same average years of schooling than their second generation counterpart,
their earnings gap would have been lower, predicting a direct loss of human capital for this group of immigrants
lower than the one estimated.
42A formal test on their dierence gives an estimate of zC   zH = 0:29 with a standard error of 0:071.
43Other than the parameters z and , the only other notable dierence between Model 1 and 3 is the value
that takes the cost of education for rst generation Mexicans. In Model 1, it is estimated to be 0.55 compared
to 0.26 in Model 3. The reason is that, allowing for dierent human capital losses, Model 3 estimates a much
greater loss for college than high school educated immigrants, which is an implicit additional cost of education.
230 - Model Beta-2. Table 6 shows the re-estimated parameters together with the benchmark
model. In general the parameters do not dier substantially from one model to another, with
the notable exception of the variance of the disutility cost. The benchmark model estimates
a variance of 0.32; the model with a  reduced by half estimates a variance of 0.14; and the
model with no altruism,  = 0, estimates a variance of 0.04. Another important dierence
between the three models is the goodness of t, which shows that both of the alternative
models perform worse than the benchmark. However, the distance between the benchmark
model and the rst model is much lower than between the benchmark and the second model.
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
Benchmark Model Model Beta-1 Model Beta-2
Parameter Point Est. s.e. Point Est. s.e. Point Est. s.e.
mx;C 0.598 0.086 0.584 0.090 0.583 0.082
mx 1.095 0.123 1.084 0.064 1.093 0.068
us;H 1.943 0.057 1.942 0.023 1.943 0.016
us;C 1.964 0.046 1.967 0.034 1.968 0.027
m 0.260 0.122 0.253 0.461 0.276 0.165
us 0.109 0.056 0.110 0.016 0.110 0.026
zH 0.346 0.017 0.345 0.032 0.317 0.015
zC 0.644 0.060 0.640 0.369 0.579 0.175
  2.925 0.058 2.148 0.072 1.674 0.013
2
  0.323 0.023 0.140 0.050 0.038 0.012
(^ ; ^ 
) 11.86 13.69 22.28
The reason why the model with no altruism performs substantially worse than the other
two is that it is not capable of reproducing the evolution of education and earnings from the
second to the third generation, which identies the selection mechanism.44 The model with a
lower but positive level of altruism is capable of tting the evolution as much as the benchmark
model, and does this by estimating a much lower variance for the disutility shock distribution.
The altruism drives the positive selection, and the greater it is, the stronger is the positive
selection. However, a stronger positive selection can also be obtained with a lower variance of
the distribution of the disutility cost. Therefore, by changing  and 2
  in the same direction,
44Table B.2 in Appendix B shows the moments simulated under the three alternative models. The rst two
models do not dier substantially and this explains the close t. The worse t of the third model comes from
two main moments the model is not capable to reproduce: the college share and the earnings of the second
generation.
24it is possible to keep constant the t of the model for a large range of values for the two
parameters. This explains why it is impossible to identify both parameters at the same time.
However, if we set  = 0, the model cannot reproduce the positive selection necessary to t
the model for any value of the variance of the disutility cost, resulting in a worse t of the
model. Therefore, the empirical analysis of the model provides evidence of the importance of
altruism in determining the migration decision, and in determining the positive self selection.
Overall the results from the estimation suggest four important facts: 1) immigrants face
an important loss of human capital used in the labor market upon migration; 2) the loss of
human capital for college educated immigrants is higher than for immigrants with high school
education; 3) there is no loss of capacity to transfer human capital to children; and 4) altruism
is an important factor in determining the migration decision and the selection mechanism. The
rst two facts imply that the human capital actually brought by immigrants is greater than
what the earnings suggest. Previous studies focused on the earnings of immigrants to assess
the amount of human capital they bring and the consequent selection pattern. Compared to
previous studies, I nd that the actual human capital brought by immigrants is 0.644 log-points
higher conditional on college educated and 0.346 log-points higher for high school educated
immigrants when the capacity to transfer it to future generations is considered. In fact, the
third fact implies that, while the rst generation incurs a signicant and sizable loss of human
capital, their children are not aected by this loss and can expect to inherit the same amount
of abilities, whether or not the parents migrate. This result is also consistent with Caponi
(2006) that demonstrates that the loss of human capital is a positive function of education.
The second result explains why there is a jump in the earnings from the rst to the second
generation of Mexicans in the US, a jump that is not present from the second to the third
generation. This explanation does not require negative self selection as postulated by Borjas
(1993). The following section looks in more detail at how the model works with particular
attention at how the self selection mechanism is determined.
6.1 Self Selection and Intergenerational Assimilation
A question that has important policy implications and that motivates a large part of the
migration literature is how \good" are the immigrants entering the host country; where good
25refers to how skilled they are, and how likely they are to successfully integrate. Using the
estimated model we can evaluate the quality of Mexican immigrants in terms of unobservable
as well as observable characteristics, and as such evaluate the amount of human capital brought
to the US by the rst generation and how this human capital is transferred to the successive
generations. Table 7 reports the average abilities for Mexican immigrants and non-migrants
in Mexico unconditional and conditional on the educational choice.
Table 7: Average Abilities and self selection
Decision Manual Ability (H) Intellectual Ability (C)
Migrant 0.025 0.049
Non-migrant -0.003 -0.009
Migrant with High School 0.042 -0.051
Migrant with College -0.088 0.711
Non-migrant with High School 0.016 -0.128
Non-migrant with College -0.109 0.641
Rows 3 and 5 of Table 7 show the averages of the manual and intellectual ability conditional
on high school for migrants and non-migrants, respectively. For the manual ability, the average
ability for migrants is higher than for non-migrants, which indicates positive selection. The
same is also true for the average intellectual ability, which indicates that high school educated
immigrants are positively selected with respect to both abilities. A comparison of rows 4 and
6, reveals the selection conditional on choosing a college education. Again, immigrants are
positively selected with respect to both abilities. Not surprisingly, the rst two rows of the
table show that, unconditional on the educational choice, the averages of both abilities are
higher for immigrants than for non-migrants.45 Therefore, immigrants are positively selected
with respect to both the abilities.46
45Note that the unconditional value of the intellectual ability is negative in both cases. This is because the
average intellectual ability in Mexico is aected by the positive selection of immigrants, or negative selection of
non-migrants. Therefore, new generations of Mexicans have on average less intellectual ability than they would
if there was not migration, i.e. zero.
46It should be noted that the model assumes that fertility is independent on abilities and equal for every
individual. Dierential fertility across educational groups might have an impact on the average earnings on
dierent generations. If lower ability parents tend to have more children than higher ability parents the decreased
average earnings among college educated could be due in part to dierential fertility. Yet Preston and Campbell
(1993), for example, nds evidence that a worsening in the ability distribution from one generation to another
cannot be explained uniquely by fertility dierentials but must be accompanied by a higher than steady state
equilibrium average ability in the original generation. Moreover, as Retherford and Sewell (1989) claim, the
evidence of a relationship between ability and fertility is much weaker for men than for women. Therefore,
26That immigrants are positively self selected with respect to the intellectual ability might
seem counterintuitive since the college educated are the ones who are most aected by the
human capital loss. Indeed it is the selection with respect to the intellectual ability that is
strong and positive and that drives the positive selection of both abilities.47 The selection
with respect to the manual ability is negative but weaker. Due to the positive correlation
between the two abilities, this implies that it is the intellectual ability that drives the selection
mechanism. The reason for the positive selection is altruism. Immigrants with higher level of
intellectual ability migrate for the better educational opportunities oered in the US to their
children and grandchildren.
This nding is consistent with proposition 3 in Mayer (2008) and reinforces it. In his paper
Mayer proves that a strong positive correlation between the two abilities creates a positive
correlation between parents' earnings and the probability that children attend college. In the
case of immigrants, parents with larger amounts of intellectual ability tend to migrate more and
tend to choose to remain high school educated. However, they migrate with the expectation of
their children becoming college educated. This suggests that even if less educated, immigrants
are among the best individuals in terms of their levels of intellectual ability.
Table 8 shows that the intergenerational assimilation into the US labor market of successive
generation of Mexicans should be faster than the earnings of the rst generation suggest.
The table reports the human capital, valued at market prices, by sector and aggregate in
the benchmark case and in a counterfactual scenario where  is assumed to be equal to 1.
That is, the loss of human capital faced by immigrants is a permanent intergenerational loss
transferred to the future generations. The gures reported are in thousands of US dollars
per person, and assume that the present value of lifetime earnings for high school educated
non-migrant Mexicans is 50,000 US dollars.48 The rst row shows the human capital of non-
migrant Mexicans, the second the rst generation of immigrants and the third row the second
generation.
looking at males only, even accounting for dierential fertility cannot rule out a role for positive self selection
of immigrants to explain the lower earnings of college educated third generation Mexicans compared to their
second generation counterpart.
47Appendix D gives a proof that the positive selection is due to altruism and is driven by the intellectual
ability.
48See footnote 37 for an explanation on how this gure is obtained.
27Table 8: Human Capital Accounting
Generation Benchmark  = 0 Counterfactual  = 1
(H) (C) (A) (H) (C) (A)
Non-Mig. 50.00 172.85 68.99 50.16 167.70 68.78
1st Gen. 253.65 383.88 270.81 253.35 387.21 268.90
2nd Gen. 357.85 589.64 463.52 358.30 580.92 412.03
Compared to the benchmark case, in the counterfactual experiment the aggregate human
capital per person of the second generation drops by 50,000 US dollars from 463,000 to 413,000
US dollars, more than 10% - row 3, columns 3 and 6. By sector the dierence is less pronounced
and only appears for the college educated that in the counterfactual scenario lose about 5,000
US dollars. Therefore, most of the loss of human capital is due to a drop in the share of
college educated among the second generation. In contrast, the aggregate human capital per
person of the rst generation is not substantially dierent between the benchmark and the
counterfactual. This suggests that, if the loss of human capital is a one time/one generation
loss, the human capital transmitted to the second generation is higher. This conrms that,
as reported in the previous section, immigrants bring more human capital than their earnings
show. This excess of human capital of immigrants can be inferred by looking at the second
generation immigrants.
7 Policy Evaluation
In this section I rst look a the eects of a policy that aims at integrating immigrants faster
in the host country, then I look at the eects of a policy aimed at increasing the educational
attainment in Mexico or of Mexicans in the US by lowering the cost of a college education.49
Examples of integration policies are programs that teach the ocial language to immigrants,
or that help immigrants to adapt their skills to the local labor market.
I assume that integration policies can be translated into lower losses of human capital. I
also take into account two dierent scenarios, one in which the programs target high school
educated immigrants, and therefore reduces the loss of human capital only for that group,
49The model presented in this paper is a partial equilibrium model. The migration 
ow and composition may
also have an eect on the skill prices that the partial equilibrium specication is unable to capture. Therefore,
some caution must be used in interpreting the results of the counterfactual experiments.
28and another in which the college educated are targeted. I assume, conservatively, that the
cost of the policy is equal to value of the human capital \recovered." Alternatively, the policy
can be thought as giving a subsidy to immigrants of a certain educational group to integrate
their salary. To properly compare the alternative scenarios, I impose that each policy has the
same aggregate cost.50 Because the number of immigrants aected by the second policy is
smaller, the amount spent for each individual is larger. Each policy implies that the loss of
human capital of the targeted group is lower than the benchmark case. When the high school
educated are targeted their loss of human capital decreases from 0.3457 to 0.2867; when the
college educated immigrants are targeted their initial loss of 0.6444 becomes 0.4584.
Table 9 reports the human capital, valued at market prices, by sector and aggregate under
the alternative policies and the benchmark. The gures reported are in thousands of US
dollars per person, and assume that the present value of lifetime earnings for high school
educated non-migrant Mexicans is 50,000 US dollars.51 Row 1, 2 and 3 show the human
capital of non-migrant Mexicans, the rst generation and the second generation, respectively.
The last row shows the cost of the policy per person. The eectiveness of the policies can
be compared by looking at the value of the aggregate human capital per person for the rst
and the second generation. Compared to the benchmark case, the aggregate human capital
of the rst generation increases from about 271,000 to 278,000 US dollars, an increase of less
than 8,000 US dollars per person. This compares with a cost of the policy of about 12,600
US dollars per person. Overall, with the rst policy we have a net loss. Moreover, the human
capital per person for the second generation is lower under the rst policy compared to the
benchmark. Therefore, the policy does not bring any gain with future generations either.
The second policy compares much more favorably than the rst to the benchmark. By
targeting the college educated the human capital of the rst generation increases from 270,000
to 315,000 US dollars per person, an increase of about 45,000 US dollars. Compared to
the 13,280 US dollars of its cost, the improvement is much larger and implies a net gain.52
50I rst assume that an equivalent of about 13,760 US dollars per person is spent to increase the human
capital of immigrants with high school or less. Given the migration and education choices I calculate the total
cost of the policy by multiplying the per-person amount by the total number of immigrants with high school or
less, and impose that the second policy has the same aggregate cost.
51See footnote 37 for an explanation on how this gure is obtained.
52The cost of the policy per person is higher under the second policy than the rst because the migration rate
is lower. Since the aggregate cost is kept constant, a lower number of immigrants increases the cost per person.
29Table 9: Counterfactual Simulation: Policy Evaluation - Human Capital
Generation Benchmark Counterfactual 1 Counterfactual 2
(H) (C) (A) (H) (C) (A) (H) (C) (A)
Non-Mig. 50.00 172.85 68.99 50.16 167.70 71.91 49.98 172.55 68.57
1st Gen. 253.65 383.88 270.81 268.73 387.21 280.98 254.14 456.59 285.48
2nd Gen. 357.85 589.64 463.52 358.30 580.92 457.65 360.03 581.34 465.04
Pol. Cost 13.76 12.34 35.07 5.43
Counterfactual 1: zH = 0:2867, zC = 0:6444
Counterfactual 2: zH = 0:3457, zC = 0:4584
Moreover, the gain is transferred to the second generation as well, which earns 18,000 US
dollars more under the second policy compared to the benchmark. Overall, by targeting
college educated immigrants, the policy intensies the brain drain from Mexico attracting
more highly skilled immigrants. The eect of the brain drain can also be seen by looking at
the non-migrant Mexicans in row 1. Under the rst policy the aggregate human capital per
person slightly increases compared to the benchmark, implying a mild reduction of the brain
drain. Under the second policy there is a marked decline due to a stronger brain drain.
Overall the policy experiment suggests that policies aiming at rapidly integrating immi-
grants in the host country can have the eect of increasing the earnings potential of immigrants.
However, a cost-benet analysis shows that a policy that targets college educated immigrants
is much more eective than one that targets high school educated. Targeting college educated
not only benets the rst generation immigrants but also their children and grandchildren,
who benet from the stronger positive self selection.
The other two scenarios presented here consider an exogenous change to the cost o a college
education in Mexico and in the US. The rst scenario assumes that there is a 5% decrease in the
cost of college in Mexico represented by a transfer of 3,000 dollars to every student attending
college, the second assumes a decrease in the US cost of college by a transfer of the same
amount to every student attending a college in the US.
Table 10 reports the human capital by sector and aggregate under the alternative policies
and the benchmark. Columns 3 and 6 in second row show that decreasing the cost of attending
college in Mexico reduces the average human capital brought by immigrants into the US.
Table B.5 in Appendix B reports the simulated moments under both policies.
30The reduction is transferred to the second generation, which has a lower human capital per
person. In contrast, Column 1 show that the human capital possessed by Mexicans increases
signicantly. A look at the rst row of Table B.6 in Appendix B also shows that the overall
migration rate declines slightly. Overall, by eect of the policy there would be a lower 
ow
of migrants especially among the most educated and with higher intellectual ability. Looking
at columns 2 and 4, in second row it is possible to notice that the average human capital for
college educated actually increases among the immigrants compared to the benchmark case.
This means that conditional on college education the selection mechanism is actually positive
and stronger than in the benchmark. However, this fact is mainly due to the stronger selection
into education among immigrants rather than the selection into migration for people with high
intellectual ability. In fact, as row 3 claries, the unconditional average level of intellectual
ability among immigrants is lower under the policy than in the benchmark case. This is why
the average human capital among the second generation Mexicans with a college education is
much lower under the policy than in the benchmark.53 Overall, the eect of the policy is to
contain the brain drain from Mexico to the US. Immigrants are less self-selected with respect
to the intellectual ability, even though conditional on being college educated they are more
selected than in the benchmark case. In contrast, the non-migrant Mexicans have a higher
human capital per person. The migration rate falls when the cost of college college decreases
in Mexico, and, while the share of college educated among non-migrant Mexicans increases,
among rst generation immigrants decreases. This fact explains the increase in the aggregate
human capital per person in Mexico and its fall in the US.
Table 10: Counterfactual Simulation: Reducing the Cost of College - Human Capital
Generation Benchmark Lower College Cost MX Lower College Cost US
(H) (C) (A) (H) (C) (A) (H) (C) (A)
Non-Mig. 50.00 172.85 68.99 50.31 163.42 74.64 49.99 172.80 68.94
1st Gen. 253.65 383.88 270.81 253.08 386.14 263.78 253.75 384.21 270.98
2nd Gen. 357.85 589.64 463.52 359.31 570.91 451.86 359.66 581.84 463.27
The second scenario shows the eects of an decrease in the cost of a college education in
53Moreover, from Table B.6 in Appendix B it is possible to see that even the educational attainment is slightly
worse.
31the US. In this case the results are opposed to the ones reported above. The human capital
per person in Mexico decreases, while it increases in the US for the rst and second generation.
This is primarily due to the increase in the college share for the rst and second generation,
and a reduction for the non-migrants Mexicans.53Overall, the increased skill premium in the
US drives a stronger positive selection with respect to the intellectual ability which mainly
translates in more college educated among the rst and the second generation Mexicans.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides an explanation of the intergenerational dynamics of earnings and edu-
cational attainment of successive generations of Mexicans in the US that does not rely on
negative self selection. The explanation is based on three main concepts. The rst concept
is that immigrants have diculties adapting their abilities in the host country. This includes
language ability, social skills, and dierent cultural traits that represent the formidable chal-
lenge of adapting acquired skills from one's mother country to another country. This diculty
translates to a reduced capacity toward using one's abilities to produce earnings and, therefore,
results in lower earnings. The second concept is that individuals are endowed with two abilities
that can be used alternatively depending on the acquired level of education. The intellectual
ability is used if some college education is acquired. Alternatively, the manual ability is used.
The third concept is that there is a transfer of abilities from parents to their children. In this
respect, immigrants' capacity to transfer their abilities to their children is not reduced. There-
fore, while immigrants are observed to earn less because they nd it dicult to adapt their
skills to the host country, their children earn more because they can inherit all the abilities of
their parents, including that part that could not be used for producing earnings.
A partial equilibrium intergenerational altruistic model that is capable of interpreting the
main features of Mexican migration is built and estimated. By allowing agents to be endowed
with two distinct abilities the model is capable of capturing the complexity of the selection
mechanism. The estimation results highlight some important facts: 1) immigrants face an
important loss of human capital upon migration; 2) the loss of human capital for college
educated immigrants is higher than for immigrants with high school education or lower; 3)
there is no loss of capacity to transfer human capital to children; 4) altruism is an important
32factor that motivates migration; and 5) immigrants are overall positively self selected with
respect to their abilities.
Interestingly the paper also nds that even among the high school educated, immigrants
are positively selected with respect to the intellectual ability. This is because immigrants
care about their children. Parents with larger amounts of intellectual ability tend to migrate
more and tend to choose to remain high school educated. However, they migrate with the
expectation of their children becoming college educated. Therefore, measures that rely on the
earnings performance and educational attainment of immigrants underestimate the amount of
human capital they bring into the host country.
In this sense, this paper reverses the pessimistic view implied by negative selection and
intergenerational transmission of abilities theory proposed by Borjas (1993). A reason why new
immigrant cohorts are observed to do worse in terms of earnings than the previous European
based waves of immigrants may be given by a higher diculty to adapt their skills to the new
country. However, future generations of Mexican Americans should be observed to assimilate as
fast as other previous ethnic groups did, provided that there are not other exogenous obstacles
that prevent this integration.
Finally, the paper evaluates alternative policies that aim at integrating immigrants into
the US labor market, or that contrast the brain drain from Mexico to the US. The simulation
results show that the targeting college educated rather than high school educated immigrants
generates larger eects on human capital. By reducing the loss of human capital faced by
college educated immigrants, the policy generates direct positive eects on the overall human
capital and earnings of the rst generation, but also indirect eects on the rst and the second
generation by strengthening the self selection process of immigrants. In contrast, the policy
that contrasts the brain drain by reducing the cost of education in Mexico. The simulation
results indicate that this policy is eective in contrasting the brain drain from Mexico to
the US. Immigrants become less self-selected with respect to human capital and among non-
migrant Mexicans the average human capital increases. Moreover, the policy also reduces the
migration rate especially among the highly educated Mexicans.
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36Appendix A Data, Moments and Covariance Matrix
This section illustrates how the moments are created from the data and how the covariance
matrix is derived. The data set is formed by pooling together observations on Mexicans living
in Mexico, and Mexicans living in the US, of rst, second and third generation. Information
about Mexican born individuals living in the US is obtained using the pooled 1994-2008 CPS
data. In order to obtain an estimate of the Mexican population living in the US in 2000, I
re-weigh the CPS observations in each survey year dierent from 2000 to obtain an aggregate
number of the Hispanic population equal to the number present in 2000. Then I divide the
weight of all observations by the number of surveys used. The re-weighting guarantees that the
sum of all weighted observations from the pooled CPS data reproduce the Mexican population
present in the US in 2000. Information on Mexicans living in Mexico is obtained using the
2000 Mexican census. I use a public use micro sample of 1% of the Mexican population in
order to obtain an estimate of the total Mexican male population between 22 and 75 years old.
I then pool the Mexican census with the CPS data to obtain one single data set containing all
the information on Mexicans living in Mexico and in the US. Once I have the unied data set
with the corrected weights, I select all male individuals between 22 and 75 who have positive
earnings, work full time, do not attend school and, in case of rst generation immigrants, who
entered the US at an age of 22 or older. Earnings are corrected to take into account top-coded
values, and the sample excludes outliers in terms of hourly wages.A.1;A.2
The moments are based on the following regression model,
A.1To build a measure of log hourly wage I use observations on yearly income from the CPS. These observations
are top-coded at dierent levels depending on the survey year. In 1994 and 1995 incomes over 100,000 dollars
were top-coded. From 1996 to 2002 the level was 150,000, and then increased to 200,000 since 2003. From
1996 the CPS does not set all the top-coded observations equal to the top-code level. Instead the averages
incomes of six categories of individuals conditional on being top-coded are calculated. These categories are
Hispanics, blacks and whites divided by men and women. Then each top-coded observation is replaced with
the conditional mean corresponding to the group of the individual with top-coded income. To correct for top-
coding I rst re-assign the top-coding threshold value to each top-coded observation, then I build a measure of
log hourly earnings for all top-coded and non top-coded observations. Once I have this measure I calculate the
expected mean value of the top-coded observations by estimating a Tobit model, assuming that log-hourly wages
are normally distributed. Once I have the mean value I adjust each top-coded observation by the dierence
between the expected mean from the Tobit estimation and the top-coded value.
A.2For the US earnings below half of the federal minimum wage in 2000 - $5.15/2, and above $250 are excluded.




where log(wi) represents log-hourly wages regressed on a set of dummy variables G0s indicating
dierent generation/education groups and a set individual characteristics Xi. Among the indi-
vidual characteristics I use a quadratic function of age - centered at 48 years - interacted with
the set of the G dummies to allow dierent eects for each group, geographical dummies and,
for data on Mexicans in the US, the year of birth of the individual.A.3 Dummy variables were
constructed to represent the generations of Mexicans: GiH and GiC with i = 1;2;3 for rst,
second and third generation with high school and college respectively, and G0C for Mexicans
living in Mexico with college education. The reference group captured by the intercept refers
to Mexicans living in Mexico with high school education.
Table A.1 reports the earnings moments resulting from the estimation of equation (A.1.
Focusing on the rst column of Table A.1, the intercept coecient in row 1 gives the average
log hourly wage in 2000 US dollars of the high school or lower educated group of Mexican men
residents in Mexico, which is also the group that has the lowest earnings. In row 5 an impressive
1.22 log-points, shows the returns to college in Mexico. The earnings of Mexican immigrants
with a high school degree or less are on average 1.51 log-points higher than Mexicans in Mexico
with the same level of education (row 2), while the second and third generations improve their
earnings even further earning 1.97 and 1.96 log-points more (rows 3 and 4). A similar pattern
is observed for college educated Mexicans living in the US. The rst generation of immigrants
earn on average 2.01 log-points more than high school educated Mexicans in Mexico. By the
second generation the dierence with the reference groups increases to 2.43 log-points, but
then the earnings decrease for the third generation to about 2.36.
An earnings variable, net of the eect of other exogenous variables, is created as follows,
vi = log(wi)   ^ 
Xi (A.2)
and form another set of dummy variables for generation groups as follows, D0H for Mexicans
living in Mexico with high school education, D0 = D0H+D0C for all Mexicans living in Mexico,
A.3The geographical dummies are for states in Mexico and metropolitan status in the US. The reference groups
are large cities for the US and the district of Mexico City for Mexico.
38Table A.1: Earnings Gaps Between Dierent Generations of Mexicans
Dependent Var.: Log Hourly Wage Standard Denition Stricter Denition
Men Women Men Women
Intercept 0.6474 0.6039 0.6444 0.6105
(0.0129) (0.0197) (0.0124) (0.0191)
1st Gen. Imm. w/o Coll. 1.6263 1.3507 1.6231 1.3629
(0.0194) (0.0274) (0.0167) (0.0249)
2nd Gen. Mexicans w/o Coll. 1.9742 1.6701 1.9676 1.6769
(0.0261) (0.0332) (0.0246) (0.0322)
3rd Gen. Mexicans w/o Coll. 1.9642 1.6384 1.9636 1.6504
(0.0209) (0.0272) (0.0188) (0.0254)
Mexicans with Coll. 1.2230 1.1440 1.2232 1.1440
(0.0081) (0.0118) (0.0079) (0.0116)
1st Gen. Imm. Coll. 2.0095 1.7161 2.0490 1.7552
(0.0276) (0.0391) (0.0236) (0.0342)
2nd Gen. Mexicans Coll. 2.4288 2.1212 2.4065 2.1275
(0.0274) (0.0332) (0.0268) (0.0331)
3rd Gen. Mexicans Coll. 2.3636 2.0889 2.3628 2.1015
(0.0218) (0.0276) (0.0197) (0.0258)
N.OBS. 133567 64784 147044 69988
R2 0.6424 0.6192 0.6689 0.6315
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Di = DiH + DiC with i = 1;2;3 for all rst, second and third generation immigrants. Finally
D[01] = D0 + D1 for all Mexican born individuals. All the moments I use are calculated using
regression models. The rst set of moments are the migration rate and the share of college
graduates among generations 0, 1, 2 and 3. The migration rate is obtained as the fraction of
observations belonging to generation 1 over the total Mexican born individuals. I assume that
the following model generates the data,
D1i = RmD[01] + mi (A.3)
Similarly, to obtain the share of college educated individuals for each generation I assume
the following models generate the data,
DjHi = RjiDji + ji for j = 0;1;2;3 i = 1;:::;N (A.4)
The second set of moments are the rst moments of the earnings distributions conditional on
the education/generation group. I obtain these moments assuming the following models,
39vi =  vjkiDjki + jki for j = 0;1;2;3 k = L;H i = 1;:::;N (A.5)
Assumptions about the error terms
The basic assumption about the error terms is that they are IID within and across each model.
In other words, errors can be correlated across models only if they come from the same draw,
or observation.
Variances and Covariances
The variance of an estimator of the rst set can be easily derived by noticing rst that,
^ Rm =
P






















or, since D2 = D,






























and assuming there is no heteroscedasticity and that cross-correlations are all zeros, we have,






















Similarly, we have that the share of college educated over the total population of generation
zero is given by,
^ R0H =
P















40Therefore if we wanted to calculate the covariance between the migration rate and the college
share of generation 0 we have,














or, since D[01]D0 = D0























Other covariances for the rst set of moments are all zero, as it easy to verify,










and since when i 6= j DiDj = 0, the covariance is zero.
The second set of moments is given by the earnings. Similarly to before we can write,
^  vjk =
P
v  Djk P
D2
jk











Because whenever jk 6= xy, DjkDxy = 0 all the covariances between the moments belonging
to the second set of moments are zero. More interesting is to look at the covariances between
moments of the rst and the second set. Let's start with the migration rate,













for j = 0;1, D[01]Djk = Djk, therefore,




for j = 2;3 the covariance is instead zero. For the other covariances,





if i = j then the covariance is,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One additional problem is the normalization that is done to the moments by subtracting the
lowest category average earnings to all the other earnings such that the earnings moments
become,
^  vjk   ^  v0L 8jk 6= 0L (A.22)
We then have seven earning moments instead of eight. In this case, the variances of the earning
moments must take into account the normalization, so that, since the covariance between each
original earning average is zero we can write,
V (^  vjk   ^  v0L) = V (^  vjk) + V (^  v0L) (A.23)
Moreover, the covariances between the new earning moments need also to be re-evaluated,
Cov(^  vjk   ^  v0L;^  vxy   ^  v0L) = E[(^  vjk   ^  v0L    vjk +  v0L)(^  vxy   ^  v0L    vxy +  v0L)] (A.24)
Once again, because all the covariances between the original earning moments are zero, this
simplies to,
Cov(^  vjk   ^  v0L;^  vxy   ^  v0L) = V (^  v0L) (A.25)
In all the other covariances involving earnings moments, the covariance between the average
earning of the lowest earning group and the moment considered must be subtracted. For
example,
Cov( ^ RjH;^  vjk   ^  v0L) = Cov( ^ RjH;^  vjk)   Cov( ^ RjH;^  v0L) (A.26)
44Appendix B Model Simulations
By looking at rows 6 and 10 in table B.1, it is possible to understand why Models 2 and 3
perform substantially better than Model 1. In Model 1, the simulated earnings of high school
educated immigrants (row 6) are much lower than the data counterpart, while the earnings
of college educated (row 10) are higher. In Models 2 and 3, these dierences vanish almost
completely.
Table B.1: Data Moments for the SMM Estimation: Males only
Moment Data Sim. Model 1 Sim. Model 2 Sim. Model 3
Migration Rate 0.100 0.101 0.099 0.100
College Mex. in Mex. 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.155
College 1st Gen. in US 0.134 0.129 0.133 0.132
College 2st Gen. in US 0.454 0.454 0.453 0.456
College 3st Gen. in US 0.437 0.436 0.434 0.437
Earnings HS 1st Gen. in US 1.626 1.569 1.624 1.624
Earnings HS 2st Gen. in US 1.974 1.975 1.972 1.968
Earnings HS 3st Gen. in US 1.964 1.970 1.964 1.963
Earnings C. Mex. in Mex. 1.223 1.219 1.222 1.222
Earnings C. 1st Gen. in US 2.009 2.251 2.013 2.015
Earnings C. 2st Gen. in US 2.429 2.415 2.411 2.423
Earnings C. 3st Gen. in US 2.364 2.403 2.403 2.404
B.1 Sensitivity Analysis: 
Table B.2 shows the moments simulated under the three alternative models. The rst two
models do not dier substantially and this explains the close t. The worse t of the third
model comes from two main moments the model is not capable to reproduce: the college share
and the earnings of the second generation.
Table B.3 reports the self selection patterns under the alternative models. The table clearly
shows that the model with no altruism predicts negative instead than positive selection with
respect to the intellectual ability. A small positive selection with respect to the manual ability
persists even with no altruism. The self selection with no altruism is entirely driven by those
potential migrants that switch education if they migrate. If their disutility cost is too high
to migrate they stay in Mexico and acquire a college education, if it is low enough, then
migrate and remain with a high school education. The probability to migrate for \switchers"
45Table B.2: Counterfactual Experiment
Moment Benchmark Counterf. 1 ( = 0:1540) Counterf. 2 ( = 0)
Migration Rate 0.100 0.101 0.098
College Mex. in Mex. 0.155 0.154 0.154
College 1st Gen. in US 0.132 0.132 0.131
College 2st Gen. in US 0.456 0.454 0.443
College 3st Gen. in US 0.437 0.440 0.440
Earnings HS 1st Gen. in US 1.624 1.625 1.628
Earnings HS 2st Gen. in US 1.968 1.970 1.965
Earnings HS 3st Gen. in US 1.963 1.962 1.961
Earnings C. Mex. in Mex. 1.222 1.211 1.221
Earnings C. 1st Gen. in US 2.015 2.020 2.025
Earnings C. 2st Gen. in US 2.423 2.421 2.396
Earnings C. 3st Gen. in US 2.404 2.405 2.403
is increasing with the manual ability and decreasing with the intellectual one, which justies
the selection pattern.
Table B.3: Average Abilities and self selection
Counterfactual 1 ( = :158) Counterfactual 2( = 0)
Decision Ability (H) Ability (C) Ability (H) Ability (C)
Migrant 0.028 0.049 0.004 -0.007
Non-migrant -0.004 -0.009 -0.000 0.006
Migrant with High School 0.044 -0.052 0.021 -0.107
Migrant with College -0.079 0.709 -0.109 0.655
Non-migrant with High School 0.016 -0.128 0.019 -0.113
Non-migrant with College -0.110 0.642 -0.106 0.657
Table B:4 reports the schooling choices of children conditional on the education of parents.
It possible to see that the worsening in the educational distribution is driven primarily by
more intergenerational persistence in the lower educational category and consequently a lower
advancement in the educational attainment from one generation to the next.
Table B.4: Children Education Conditional on Parents Education
Parent/Child Benchmark Counterfactual 1 ( = :158) Counterfactual 2 ( = 0)
HS=HS 0.507 0.507 0.518
HS=Coll: 0.362 0.360 0.351
Coll:=HS 0.037 0.039 0.039
Coll:=Coll: 0.094 0.094 0.093
46B.2 Policy Evaluations: Simulated Moments
Table B.5: Counterfactual Simulation: Policy Evaluation - Moments
Moment Benchmark Counterfactual 1 Counterfactual 2
(zH = 0:2867, zC = 0:6444) (zH = 0:3457, zC = 0:4584)
Migration Rate 0.100 0.094 0.105
College Mex. in Mex. 0.155 0.185 0.152
College 1st Gen. in US 0.132 0.103 0.155
College 2st Gen. in US 0.456 0.446 0.474
College 3st Gen. in US 0.437 0.437 0.451
Earnings HS 1st Gen. in US 1.624 1.619 1.626
Earnings HS 2st Gen. in US 1.968 1.966 1.975
Earnings HS 3st Gen. in US 1.963 1.960 1.965
Earnings C. Mex. in Mex. 1.222 1.188 1.221
Earnings C. 1st Gen. in US 2.015 2.019 2.002
Earnings C. 2st Gen. in US 2.423 2.403 2.406
Earnings C. 3st Gen. in US 2.404 2.401 2.393
Table B.6: Counterfactual Simulation: Cost of College - Moments
Moment Benchmark Higher Ret. MX Higher Ret. US
Migration Rate 0.100 0.094 0.111
College Mex. in Mex. 0.155 0.185 0.147
College 1st Gen. in US 0.132 0.103 0.194
College 2st Gen. in US 0.456 0.446 0.505
College 3st Gen. in US 0.437 0.437 0.472
Earnings HS 1st Gen. in US 1.624 1.619 1.629
Earnings HS 2st Gen. in US 1.968 1.966 1.970
Earnings HS 3st Gen. in US 1.963 1.960 1.967
Earnings C. Mex. in Mex. 1.222 1.238 1.219
Earnings C. 1st Gen. in US 2.015 2.019 2.029
Earnings C. 2st Gen. in US 2.423 2.403 2.452
Earnings C. 3st Gen. in US 2.404 2.401 2.425
47Appendix C Additional Evidence
Table C.1 reproduces the average years of schooling for each generation conditional on being
high school or college educated. For Mexicans in Mexico we see that, not only they have
the highest average years of education among college educated, but they also have the lowest
average years of education among the high school educated. Mexicans in Mexico also have
the highest returns to college, as indicated by the gap between the average earnings of college
educated and high school educated. This would suggest that part of the high returns to
education may be explained by heterogeneity within the groups. Using the returns to years of
schooling above, and realizing that the dierence in years of schooling is about 6 years larger
than for second and third generation, we could say that half of the high returns can be explained
by this type of heterogeneity. By not taking into account this type of heterogeneity the model
and its estimation produces an upward-biased parameter measuring the skill price of college
education in Mexico together with a higher cost of education. Also notice that the average
years of schooling for rst generation high school educated is more than three years lower
than the second and third generations in corresponding educational groups. This is a possible
source of bias in estimating the loss of human capital. In particular, the dierence in years
of education might, by itself, lead to lower earnings for high school educated rst generation
Mexicans compared to their second generation counterpart. In this sense, the estimated loss
of human capital for this group might be biased upward. This is not true for the college group
having very similar schooling years between rst, second and third generations.
Table C.1: Alternative Samples II - Descriptive Statistics
Men Women
Variable Mexico 1stGen 2ndGen 3rdGen Mexico 1stGen 2ndGen 3rdGen
High School
Years 6.9442 7.5935 10.9782 11.1534 7.8804 7.8364 11.0349 11.3094
s.e. (0.0118) (0.0326) (0.0375) (0.0225) (0.0193) (0.0517) (0.0425) (0.0226)
N. obs 88803 11726 2900 6746 34084 4565 2087 5266
College
Years 16.0891 14.1232 13.7679 13.8476 15.8640 13.9926 13.8368 13.8257
s.e (0.0125) (0.0294) (0.0227) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.0361) (0.0228) (0.0148)
N. obs 13645 1871 2357 5409 10052 974 2317 5330
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Among college educated the only substantial dierence is between Mexicans in Mexico
and the other three generations. Among immigrants of dierent generations the dierences
48in years of schooling of college educated, although statistically signicant, are very small with
the larger dierence being of about one third of a year between rst and second generation.
Table C.2 reports the returns to years of schooling, according to the results reported in this
table and assuming that years of schooling have log-linear returns independently on the level
of education, the dierence in years of schooling between rst and second generation would
imply that the gap between the earnings of rst and second generation with college education
should be about 1% higher, from 0.4193 to about 0.43. This clearly is a very small dierence.
The dierence between second and third generation is even smaller amounting to about 0.08
years. Again, taking into account this dierence and the returns to years of schooling, the gap
between between the second and third generation should be about 1% higher. The earning
gaps between rst and second generations mainly identify the parameters indicating the loss of
human capital that rst generations face, accounting for the possible bias due to heterogeneity
could lead to a slighter larger gap for college educated, up to about 2%. The change would be
small, and would not substantively change the results.
Table C.2 reports the regression of log hourly earnings on dummies for generations of
immigrants or for Mexicans remained in Mexico, on years of schooling interacted with the
previous dummies a quadratic function of experience and dummies for time and geography.
The table clearly show that the returns to an extra year of schooling is higher for Mexican
non-migrants than is for rst generation immigrants. The returns to years of schooling for the
other two groups are similar, showing a slightly 
atter prole for the second compared to the
third generation. The lower returns to years of schooling faced by rst generation immigrants
compared to all other Mexican generations rules out the possibility that the lower earnings
of high school or lower educated rs generation immigrants as compared to second ad third
generations are entirely due to lower educational attainment, in terms of completed years of
education, within this group. In fact, even if the average years of schooling within the high
school educated group was the same, given the lower returns to years of education we would
observe a signicant gap between rst and second generation immigrants.
49Table C.2: Returns to Years of Schooling by Generation
Dependent Var.: Log Hourly Wage
Non-Migrants 1st Gen. Imm. 2nd Gen. Imm. 3rd Gen. Imm.
Intercept -0.7425 1.1588 0.7371 0.6260
(0.0168) (0.0278) (0.0635) (0.0497)
Years of Schooling 0.1101 0.0429 0.0952 0.1030







Standard errors in parenthesis.
C.1 Sensitivity of the Results to the Denition of Second and Third Gen-
eration
Table C.3 reports the results of the regression run in Table A.1 using a dierent data set.
The data set used is taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) Latino sample
1989-1990. During 1989 the PSID collected information on an additional 2043 households of
Latinos to add to the original 1969 sample. Of these 2043 households about half were Mexican-
Americans. Unfortunately, although it was originally planned to integrate the sample with the
1969 PSID wave and build a longitudinal study for this subgroup of individuals, the sample
was later dropped and no signicant longitudinal information is available for these individuals.
However, this data set is the only source available on a nation-wide representative sample of
Mexican-Americans which has information on the birth country of the individuals, of both their
parents and all four of their grandparents. As such, this is the only data available in which an
objective denition of third generation can be applied. The three columns of the table report
the results of the regression using three dierent denition of third generation. In the rst
column the denition used is the widest and includes all the individuals who have at least one
grandparent born in Mexico. In column 2 the denition used is stricter and requires that at
least one grand parent for each parent was born in Mexico. Column 3 provides the results using
the stricter denition that all grand parents were born in Mexico. While in most cases the
standard errors are signicantly large because of the number of individuals, the results suggest
50that in general the second generation of Mexican Americans with high school or less performs
similarly or better than the third generation with the same educational level. Things are a little
dierent when we look at more educated Mexicans. In this case the returns to education seem
to be more pronounced for the third generation than the second for all denitions. However,
interestingly, the stricter the denition is the larger the gains from education are. It should be
said that the number of observations for subgroups becomes very low for stricter denitions,
and therefore the large standard errors, however the tendency is interesting in that is exactly
the opposite we would expect given the criticism raised by Duncan and Trejo (2005).
Table C.3: Earnings Gaps Between First, Second and Third Generation of Mexicans - PSID
Data
Dependent Var.: Log Hourly Wage Def. 1 Def. 2 Def. 3
Other Latinos 1.9135 1.9232 1.9231
(0.0905) (0.0888) (0.0888)
1st Gen. Mex. Imm. 1.6582 1.6701 1.6672
(0.0947) (0.0940) (0.0939)
2nd Gen. Mexicans 1.9514 1.9632 1.9604
(0.1734) (0.1724) (0.1724)
3rd Gen. Mexicans 1.9566 1.9110 1.5708
(0.2961) (0.3318) (0.4491)
3rd Gen. Mex. Self Rep. 0.0826 0.2975 0.6235
(0.2873) (0.3470) (0.4549)
Other Latinos with Coll. 0.2503 0.2272 0.2298
(0.0732) (0.0694) (0.0690)
1st Gen. Mex. Imm. Coll. 0.4103 0.4090 0.4091
(0.1282) (0.1275) (0.1275)
2nd Gen. Mexicans Coll. 0.4073 0.4054 0.4057
(0.2390) (0.2378) (0.2378)
3rd Gen. Mexicans Coll. 0.1297 0.3827 0.4288
(0.1719) (0.2730) (0.2978)
N.OBS. 518 518 518
R2 0.9408 0.9414 0.9414
PSID Latino sample 1989-1990. Standard errors in parenthesis. The table shows the evolution of
earnings across three generation of Mexicans in the US. Def.1 to Def.3 dier for how the third generation
is dened. Def.1 includes all those US born individuals with US born parents and with a lest one grand-
parent born in Mexico; Def.2 two grand-parents; Def.3 all four grand-parents. In row 5 the dummy
for third generation is interacted with a dummy for self reporting of Mexican origin. Although not
signicant, the estimates reported in row 5 fail to nd evidence that those third generation Mexicans
who identify themselves as Mexicans have lower earnings than the rest of third generation.
The last two columns of Table A.1 show that the results are robust to the denition of
51second and third generations. Including in the second generation Mexicans only those who
identify themselves as Mexicans - stricter denition - does not change substantially the results,
as it can be seen by comparing the earnings of the second generation (rows 3 and 7) in case
the standard denition is used (rst two columns) or the stricter is used (last two columns).
This gives some condence that the bias induced by relying on self-identication as Mexicans
to dene the third generation, criticized by Duncan and Trejo (2005), leads to a bias that is
negligible. Duncan and Trejo (2005) criticize the use of CPS data to infer the performance of
third generation Mexican Americans because of the diculty to objectively identify this group
of individuals. They point at the fact that only those individuals that by the third generation
still feel connected with their Mexican heritage answer that they are Mexicans, while those
that lost this connection, for example because their Mexican parents or grandparents married
White non Hispanic spouses, do not. If, as Duncan and Trejo suggest, this latter group tends
to be more integrated than the former one, and perform better in the labor market, than the
earnings and schooling measures reported underestimate their attainment. However, in their
work Duncan and Trejo admit that they can only show a direction for the bias but cannot
quantify it, while they also show that a similar bias should be present for the second generation
were we not able to objectively identify it and needed to rely of the same sort of subjective
information on ethnicity. The last two columns of Tables A.1 and 2 report the same regression
done in the rst two columns using a denition of second generation that not only relies on
place of birth of parents but also on self reported ethnicity. That is, the second generation
is now the subgroup of those US born individuals with at least one parent born in Mexico
who identify themselves as Mexicans. In fact, as indicated by Duncan and Trejo, a small
dierence exists in the earnings of this subgroup. For men the coecient in row 3 drops from
1:9694 to 1:9633, while for women drops from 1:6832 to 1:6778. For both sexes we would have
a bias of about 0:6% by using the subjective denition based on ethnicity rather than the
objective denition based on place of birth of parents only in the case of individuals without
college. Consistently with what Duncan and Trejo sustain, increases for college educated. The
coecient in row 7 drops from 2.4240 to 2.4011, a change of about 2.3% for men and from
2.1310 to 2.1244 for women a change of about 0.7%. However, the changes are in general small
and they do not aect the overall picture. In particular we still see a general worsening of the
52earnings of the third generation compared to the second for college educated, although now
signicant only at a 10% condence level. In sum, the last two columns of Table A.1 suggest
that only a very small portion of the absence of progress, or even the regression, between the
second and third generation seen in the data can be explained by the bias induced by the
subjective denition of third generation based on self reported ethnicity.
53Appendix D A Simplied Model
In this section I build a simplied model that, while conserving all the main characteristics
of the general model presented in the paper, is analytically tractable. To build this model, I
simplify the general model with two main assumptions. First, I assume that for each dynasty
there are only two generations. That is, the rst generation has children, but the second does
not. In this case the problem becomes analytically tractable. The second assumption is that
the autoregressive parameter b that governs the transmission of abilities from one generation
to the other is the same for both abilities.
These assumptions clearly would alter the original model in such a way that would be
impossible to derive precise answers to the questions of interest. However they do not change
the main features of the original model. In particular, they maintain the fact that the decisions
of an agent concerning schooling and migration are made taking into account both their current,
and their children's future welfare.
D.1 The value of Migrating
I start with the problem faced by the Mexican resident who has to decide to migrate or not
and his educational level,
maxfv1(sH;g;sC;g);v0(sH;g;sC;g)g; (D.1)
where v1(sH;g;sC;g) is the value of migrating and v0(sH;g;sC;g) the value of staying in Mexico.
The value of migrating is further decomposed in,




fus;k + sk;g   z   m;kg;
Where m;k is the cost of schooling for a Mexican immigrant. The latter component of the
value of migrating is the expected value of being born in the US for the second generation,
which is given by,
54Ev11(sH;g+1;sC;g+1) = max
k
fus;k + bsk   x + uk   us;k): (D.3)
Equation (D:3) takes into account the intergenerational transfer of ability given by the
following law of motion
sk;g+1 = bsk;g + uk:
The second generation immigrant only has to choose between high school and college as
being in the US for a US born person is always better than migrating to Mexico. The value of











(us;H + bsH   x + uH   us;H)f(uH;uC)duHduC;(D.4)
where
A = us;C   us;H + b(sC   sH)   (us;C   us;H);





(A   u)fu(u)du +
Z 1
 1
(us;H + bsH   us;H + uH)fL(uH)duH   x; (D.5)
or simply
Ev11() = us;H + bsH   x   us;H +
Z A
 1
(A   u)fu(u)du; (D.6)
where u = uH   uC. Now, equation (D:2) can be written
v1(sH;g;sC;g) = maxfus;H + sH;us;C + sC   m;Cg   z + Ev11(sH;g+1;sC;g+1); (D.7)
where it is assumed m;H = 0.
D.2 The Value of Staying
Given the greater number of options the second generation have, to calculate the value of
staying is a little more complicated. I start by writing
v0(sH;g;sC;g) = w0 + Ev0(sH;g+1;sC;g+1): (D.8)
Where w0 = maxfmx;H + sH;mx;C + sC   mx;Cg. To calculate the expected value of the
55second generation in this case I need to take into account the four available possibilities:





The second generation, conditional on the rst generation choosing to stay, choose to
migrate unconditionally if and only if
mx;H + bsH + uH < us;H + bsH   z + uH (D.10)
mx;C + bsC + uC   mx;C < us;C + bsC   z + uC   m;C; (D.11)
or
us;H   mx;H > z (D.12)
us;C   mx;C   (m;C   mx;C > z: (D.13)
However, note that if I assume that us;C us;H m;C < mx;C mx;H mx;C then equation
(D:13) implies equation (D:12). Let's dene the left hand side of equation (D.12), H =
us;H mx;H, and the left hand side of equation (D.13), C = us;C mx;C (m;C mx;C).






















A1 = us;C   us;H + b(sC   sH)   m;C;
Az = mx;C   us;H + b(sC   sH) + z   mx;C;
and,
A2 = mx;C   mx;H + b(sC   sH)   mx;C:
After some algebra





















The value of not migrating for the father is
v0() = max
k
fmx;k + sk   mx;kg + Ev01(): (D.15)
D.3 The Selection Mechanism
In order to show that the model is identied by the available data, I need to show the rela-
tionship between the incentive to migrate and its cost together with the relationship between
the incentive to migrate and the abilities. I need to verify that in all possible situations an
increased cost of migrating decreases the incentive to migrate, and check in which direction
the selection goes in terms of abilities and how the selection process reacts to a change in the
cost of migration.
First note that a person migrates if and only if
v1()   v0() > 0; (D.16)
where the value of moving is given by
v1() = max
k
fus;k + sk   mx;kg   z + Ev11: (D.17)
Therefore, a higher z implies a lower probability to migrate. Another important feature











Let's rst concentrate on the second part.
@(Ev11   Ev01)
@sH









1   Fu(A1)Fz(C) +
Z H
C
Fu(Az)fz(z)dz   [1   Fz(H)]F(A2)
)
: (D.20)





[1   Fz(H)][F(A2)   F(A1)] +
Z H
C
[Fu(Az)   F(A1)]fz(z)dz   [F(A)   F(A1)]
)
: (D.21)
Assuming that us;C us;C (us;H us;H) > mx;C mx;C mx;H it is possible to prove
that the derivative with respect to the manual ability is always negative, while the intellectual






[1   Fz(H)][F(A2)   F(A1)] +
Z H
C
[Fu(Az)   F(A1)]fz(z)dz   [F(A)   F(A1)]
)
: (D.22)
First note that z = C implies Az = A1 + m;C   mx;C. Therefore,
Z H
C








 bf[1   Fz(C)][F(A2)   F(A1)]   [F(A)   F(A1)]g: (D.25)
The rhs of equation (D:25) is clearly negative if A > A2. In other words, if the dierence
in the spread of earnings is lower than the dierence in the spread of costs, increasing the
lower ability makes the expected value of remaining in Mexico greater than going to the US.
Intuitively, if the rst generation decides to migrate, the second generation pays the cost of
education in the host country. As such, the value of being born in the US for the second
generation is lower the greater is the intellectual ability and the lower is the manual ability.
This arises because the cost for a college education is relatively lower compared to its gain
than for high school.




In this case we cannot nd a unique solution in terms of its sign. If the educational choice of
the individual is the same no matter the location she chooses, then the derivative in equation
(D.26) is zero. For example, if
sH   sC > mx;C   mx;H   mx;C > us;C   us;H   m;C
then the individual endowed with these two levels will choose to stay high school educated no
matter where will end up living. Or, alternatively, if
mx;C   mx;H   mx;C > us;C   us;H   m;C > sH   sC
then the individual will choose to acquire a college education again independently of migrating
or not. In both these cases a small change of sH that does not alter the inequality does not
change the dierence in values of migrating or not migrating due to the part relative to the
gain of the current generation. A third, intermediate, case is if
mx;C   mx;H   mx;C > sH   sC > us;C   us;H   m;C:
In this case an individual would choose to acquire a college education only if the z is high enough
to prevent her to migrate, otherwise being high school educated is better. The dierence in
values of migrating or not migrating due to the gain of the current generation is now positive
when sH increases.
If we take the derivative with respect to the intellectual ability, we obtain the same but
reversed results. Conditional on choosing college education in the host country, the selection
is necessarily positive. In fact, an individual who chooses to be college educated and migrate
would choose to be college educated even if the cost of migrating is to high to make it worth-
while. In this case, a small change in both abilities does not change the gain of migration to
the current generation. However, the gain of future generations is increasing in the intellectual
ability of the current generation, which determines positive selection. Overall, the derivatives
of migration gain with respect to both abilities are in general undetermined. When the school
choice does not change with the migration decision the derivative with respect to sH (sC)
is negative (positive), but it can be positive (negative) when, upon migration, the education
decision is changed to high school rather than college. However, provided that the population
59of switchers is relatively small compared to the rest of the populationD.1, the model is clearly
identied by the data moments.
Figure D.1: Migration Choice Based on Abilities
Figure D:1 shows, for dierent values of abilities, the gain from migration. The gure
represents a simulation using the model with one z and one x with the estimated parameters
except for the variance and the disutility cost of migration. In the color scale warmer colors
indicate higher values for the gain of migration. The rst panel simulates the model under a
very low variance of the disutility shock distribution, while in the second panel the variance
is larger. In both panels we can clearly distinguish two regions separated by positively sloped
line. The two regions contain individuals making dierent choices about their education. In
the bottom right there are individuals choosing to remain with a high school education, while
in the up left region individuals are college educated. Figure D.2 given more details on the
schooling decisions. From the rst panel we can clearly see the selection pattern, conditional
on schooling, low levels of intellectual ability lead to lower gains from migration, while higher
levels make people hotter about moving. The opposite is true for the manual ability, although
the selection is very mild. The right panel shows the same pattern, but the selection is more
blurred due to the higher variance. The gure clearly shows that a lower variance makes the
D.1Figure D.2 shows the distribution of individuals according to their schooling choices conditional on migrating
or non migrating. The gure clearly shows that the population of switchers is very small compared to the other
group.
60selection mechanism stronger.
Figure D.2: Schooling and Migration Choices Based on Abilities
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